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ABSTRACT
We use data from a cross-nationally harmonised ﬁeld experiment to
examine discrimination towards Muslim job applicants in ﬁve
European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain
and the United Kingdom). We focus on job applicants originating
from countries that have a substantial Muslim population: of
these, some signalled closeness to Islam in their job application
while others did not. With this design, we can empirically
disentangle anti-Muslim discrimination (a ‘disclosed Muslim’
eﬀect) from the possible stigma of originating from countries
where Islam is prevalent (a ‘Muslim by default’ eﬀect). Our double-
comparative design allows us to compare the extent of anti-
Muslim discrimination faced by diﬀerent origin groups in
destination countries characterised by a varying history of church-
state relations and distinctive approaches to grant cultural and
religious rights to minorities. We ﬁnd alarming levels of
discrimination, especially towards male applicants from more
visible groups. Anti-Muslim discrimination and origin-based
discrimination independently contribute to the severe
disadvantage faced by ethnic and religious minorities, a
disadvantage that is especially severe in the Norwegian labour
market.
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Introduction
Over the past few years, the arrival on European shores of asylum seekers ﬂeeing predo-
minantly Muslim countries has fuelled heated debates on the socio-economic and cultural
integration of Muslims inWestern societies. The Muslim population in Europe is expected
to grow even further in the near future, in absolute as well as relative terms, partly as a
result of the simultaneous shrinkage of the non-Muslim population (PEW 2017). The
issue of Muslim integration is all the more salient given the relatively strong religious com-
mitment of Muslim migrants, the visibility of their religious garments and the alleged
incompatibility between Muslim beliefs and the values, traditions and customs of histori-
cally Christian and highly secular destination countries, where the ‘bright boundary’ of
religion may conﬁne Islam to a marginal position in society (Foner and Alba 2008).
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Previous studies on the employment opportunities of migrants compared to majority
populations have reported especially strong penalties for Muslims, regardless of their eth-
nicity (e.g. Khattab 2009; Lindley 2002). Such ‘Muslim penalties’ were conﬁrmed in a
series of recent correspondence tests, in which candidates who signalled their aﬃliation
to Islam in the job application were at a severe disadvantage compared to equally
qualiﬁed candidates of diﬀerent religions (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010; Pierné 2013;
Valfort 2017). These studies, however, were all conducted in France and it would be pre-
mature, without a comparative design, to generalise their ﬁndings to other European
countries. Furthermore, existing works typically analyse one national origin group only.
Yet, average levels of religious commitment vary widely among origin countries (PEW
2017). Origin countries also diﬀer with regard to other characteristics such as GDP,
living standards and phenotype of their inhabitants. Given the heterogeneity of
Europe’s Muslim populations, more research is needed to map how Muslims originating
from geographic regions as varied as the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia and Eastern Europe fare in the labour market of their countries of
settlement.
In this study, we rely on a cross-nationally harmonised correspondence test to study the
economic integration of Muslim migrants originating from various countries of origin and
applying for jobs in multiple countries of destination (on the advantages of double-com-
parative designs, cf. van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004). We sent ﬁctitious applications in
ﬁve European countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United
Kingdom (UK)1 – characterised by diﬀerent levels of religious climates, a varying
history of church-state relations and distinctive approaches to grant cultural and religious
rights to minorities. We included 15 countries of origin, characterised by a substantial
Muslim population and spread across four geographic regions. To signal religion, we fol-
lowed common practice in the ﬁeld experimental literature and varied the name of the
organization where applicants did volunteer work in the CV and cover letter. This organ-
ization had either a religious connotation (i.e. a Muslim community centre) or a neutral
one (i.e. a local community centre). As such, we compare: (1) ethnic minorities from
countries with a sizeable Muslim population who mentioned Islam in their application
(‘disclosed Muslims’) with ethnic minorities from the same countries who did not
(‘Muslims by default’); and (2) ethnic minorities who volunteered in a secular organization
with majority group members who volunteered in the same organization (i.e. ‘Muslims by
default’ vs. majority group). By varying both applicants’ origin country and their closeness
to Islam, we can separate the religious signal from the country of origin of the job appli-
cant. An additional advantage of our study is the inclusion of multiple countries of origin
in the design, for it increases the external validity of our ﬁndings.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we disentangle a ‘religious closeness
eﬀect’, i.e. a discriminatory act on grounds of applicants’ religion, from a mere ‘geographic
origin eﬀect’, i.e. a discriminatory act towards applicants originating from areas commonly
associated with Islam. Second, our cross-national analysis, albeit descriptive, adds to
recent eﬀorts to understand the impact of national institutions on Muslims’ integration
within their country of settlement (e.g. Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Statham and
Tillie 2016). To foreshadow our ﬁndings, applicants originating from countries with a size-
able Muslim population experience strong discrimination, and this disadvantage further
widens if closeness to Islam is explicitly mentioned in the job application. The levels of
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discrimination faced by job applicants is particularly strong for males originating from
Africa and the Middle East and varies across destination countries, with Spain being
the most accommodating context and Norway the least favourable to Muslim integration.
The labour market integration of Muslims in European countries
The ethnic penalties literature: ethnicity, religion or neither?
Migrants from Muslim countries started to arrive in Western Europe in the 1950s and
1960s, as part of guest worker recruitment programmes (e.g. Turkish and Moroccans in
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) or post-colonial ﬂows (e.g. South Asians in
the UK). Their numbers increased over the years due to high fertility rates, family reuniﬁ-
cation and, lately, refugee migration. Muslim migrants are a far more recent phenomenon
in Southern Europe, with Morocco, Egypt or Albania being the main source countries
(Koenig, Maliepaard, and Güveli 2016; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). According to
PEW Research Centre calculations, between 2010 and 2016, 53% of all migrants to
Europe (including refugees and regular migrants) were Muslim, totalling about 3.7
million people. Recent Muslim migrants originate primarily from Morocco, Turkey, Paki-
stan, Bangladesh and, in the case of refugees, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (PEW 2017).
Overall, Muslim minorities in Europe experience a rather severe socio-economic disad-
vantage. In the recent EU-MIDIS II survey (FRA 2017), nearly 40 percent of Muslim
respondents reported to feel discriminated against when looking for work, of whom 17
percent perceived discrimination on religious grounds and 27 percent on ethnic
grounds. The same survey revealed considerable variation across origin countries and
singled out Muslims from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa as the most vulnerable
group. Worryingly, perceived religious discrimination seem to be on the rise compared
to an earlier wave of the same survey.
An obvious limitation of self-reports is their subjective nature (Pager and Shepard
2008). Some respondents may be unable to tell whether the discrimination they experience
is related to religion, ethnic origin or some other trait. Others may be unaware of discrimi-
nation and under-report it, or may misinterpret other people’s behaviour as discrimina-
tory and over-report it. A more objective analysis of Muslims’ labour market
disadvantage comes from the ethnic penalties literature. These studies are based on
regression analysis of secondary data, typically labour force surveys or population
surveys, and show that Muslim migrants, ceteris paribus, tend to be systematically disad-
vantaged in terms of labour market participation, employment and occupational attain-
ments, relative to the majority group (e.g. Connor and Koenig 2015; Khoudja and Platt
2018; van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004).
Disentangling ethnic penalties from religious penalties, however, is both conceptually
and methodologically challenging due to the high correlation between religion and ethni-
city. A number of British studies have leveraged the possibility to cross-classify migrant
groups based on their self-reported ethnicity and religious aﬃliation: they unanimously
found stronger penalties for Muslims than for other non-White groups (Cheung 2014;
Heath and Martin 2013; Johnston et al. 2010; Khattab, Johnston, and Manley 2018;
Lindley 2002). Employment penalties remained signiﬁcant even after controlling for
other relevant characteristics including ethnicity and, in some cases, language ﬂuency
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(e.g. Lindley 2002). Regardless of ethnic origin, Khattab, Johnston, and Manley (2015)
found that Muslims were more likely to be in part-time employment and overqualiﬁed
than the ChristianWhite British majority and that these gaps widened after the 2008 econ-
omic recession. Heath andMartin (2013) as well as Cheung (2014) concluded that religion
penalties are strong in magnitude and that ethnic penalties can largely be explained by reli-
gious aﬃliation. Khattab (2009, 319) went as far as saying that ‘ethnicity per se is not an
important factor but operates as a proxy, and… skin colour and culture (religion) are to a
greater extent probably the main mechanisms that operate to reinforce disadvantage
among some groups’.
Some of the ethnic penalty studies examined heterogeneous eﬀects across Muslim
groups. Their ﬁndings suggest that skin colour – as a visible marker of otherness – may
exacerbate the religious penalties of speciﬁc groups. For example, Johnston et al. (2010)
using British Census data found signiﬁcantly higher returns to education for Indian
Muslim males than Pakistani and Bangladeshi. In a later study, White-British Muslim
women faced lighter unemployment penalties than all other Muslim groups, with Black
Muslim women suﬀering the most severe earning and unemployment penalties
(Khattab and Hussein 2018).
Taken together, these studies have made an explicit eﬀort to categorise migrants along
both ethnic and religious lines and empirically parse out ethnic penalties from religious
ones. The evidence on ethno-religious penalties, however, is limited to the UK, as
cross-national datasets like the European Social Survey do not distinguish between
Muslim sub-groups of diﬀerent ethnic origin. Another shortcoming of this literature is
that the variable used to determine respondents’ religious aﬃliation does not provide
any information on their actual involvement in religious practices, nor on the strength
of their faith.
Another group of studies have looked at religious participation, beliefs and practices
more closely. Within Europe, religiosity is often said to represent a barrier for the
labour market integration of Muslims (Foner and Alba 2008). The argument is that
migrants’ involvement in time-intensive religious practices commonly shared with co-
ethnics may be a signal of strong in-group bonding (bonding social capital) and lack of
contact with majority members (bridging social capital). While bridging social capital
channels non-redundant information over job opportunities, bonding social capital
with co-ethnics and co-religionists is not as eﬀective (Lancee 2012). Overall, there is
hardly any evidence of a negative association between religiosity and labour market par-
ticipation or employment. Khattab, Johnston, and Manley (2018) found no relationship
between religiosity and labour market participation among British Muslim women;
however, those who reported higher levels of religiosity (in terms of both faith and reli-
gious participation) were also more likely to be unemployed. In a study comparing
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, Koenig, Maliepaard, and Güveli (2016) found
that religious participation is entirely decoupled from the socio-economic integration of
Muslims. Connor and Koenig (2015) showed that frequency of praying and adhering to
more conservative value orientations did not mediate the employment gap between
Muslims and non-Muslims; if anything, religious service attendance was even positively
related to employment. One possible explanation for this very weak correlation between
religiosity and labour market outcomes is that, in secularised European societies with a
Christian heritage and widespread anti-Muslim attitudes, Muslims may be categorised
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based on rather general signals of religious aﬃliation, such as names, ‘regardless of actual
religious practice’ (Connor and Koenig 2015, 192). In other words, they may be considered
Muslim ‘by default’ (Pierné 2013, 3).
Finally, recent research has called into question the assumption, common in the ethnic
penalties literature, that unexplained labour market gaps between Muslims and the
majority group are, at least partly, due to discrimination on the part of employers. For
example, Koopmans (2016) drew attention to the role of sociocultural variables such as
interethnic social ties and gender values. In his analysis, once these variables are taken
into account, the employment gaps recorded between Muslims and non-Muslims in
unemployment and labour force participation are greatly reduced and, in some cases,
become statistically insigniﬁcant. Based on these ﬁndings, Koopmans concluded that, in
the absence of more detailed data on Muslims’ sociocultural integration, the assumption
that ethnic penalties result from employers’ discrimination is, at the very least, a ‘prema-
ture conclusion’ (p. 212).
Causal evidence from employers: ﬁeld experiments on hiring discrimination
A more direct test of whether ethnic penalties can, indeed, be ascribed to employers’ dis-
crimination comes from the ﬁeld experimental literature. Field experiments, in their two
forms of audit (in-person) or correspondence (resume-based) tests, are widely recognised
as an eﬀective method to provide clear and convincing evidence of hiring discrimination
(Pager 2007; Pager and Shepard 2008). Fictitious applications that are identical in all
respects except for the characteristic that allegedly causes discrimination are sent to
employers. Due to the experimental design, any diﬀerence in employers’ positive feedback
(i.e. callbacks) between members of the majority group and members of the minority
group of interest is considered as evidence of discrimination. While originally employed
to test ethnic (or name-based) discrimination, ﬁeld experiments – and correspondence
tests in particular, given their relatively lower costs – have been used to study discrimi-
nation on many other grounds, including religion.
Correspondence tests, however, are notwithout problems. Identifying religious discrimi-
nation, especially anti-Muslim discrimination, is a challenging task for at least two reasons.
First, religious beliefs have to be signalled in the job application in a way that is both recog-
nizable for the employer and externally valid. It is common practice to vary the names and
volunteering activities of job applicants, admittedly a rather indirect measurement of reli-
gion. Second, the strong correlation between religion and ethnicity, or country of origin, is a
concern also in ﬁeld experiments. Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2010, 22386) summarise this
issue succinctly: ‘the real killer for identifying a Muslim eﬀect is that most Muslim immi-
grants to each of the major European states come from a single country or world region’,
such as Turks in Germany or Pakistani in the UK. Previous correspondence tests relying
on North African or Middle Eastern names to signal religion may have sent to employers
a double-barrelled signal, confounding religion and country of origin. As a result, it has
proven diﬃcult to determine whether immigrants are discriminated against because of
their religious beliefs or because of the country they originate from.
A couple of recent correspondence tests have tried to address these methodological chal-
lenges. Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2010) compared Muslim and Catholic Senegalese female
immigrants in France, thus leveraging variation in religious closeness while holding the
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country of origin constant. Ceteris paribus, Muslim Senegalese applicants were 2.5 times less
likely to receive a callback than Christian Senegalese applicants, which they interpreted as
anti-Muslim discrimination. Valfort (2017) followed the same strategy but focused on
Muslim, Jewish and Catholic Lebanese immigrants to France and analysed both genders.
Her design also included proﬁles of non-practicing applicants doing voluntary work in
secular associations which, she argued, is necessary to disentangle a ‘Muslim by culture but
not religious practice’ eﬀect (or a geographic region eﬀect) from a ‘Muslimby culture and reli-
gious practice eﬀect’ (or a religious closeness eﬀect). Valfort reported strong evidence of anti-
Muslim discrimination, especially towards male applicants, who had to send four times as
many applications as theirCatholic counterparts to be invited to a job interview. Interestingly,
when applicants ofMuslimorigin presented themselves as non-religious (i.e. they volunteered
in a secular scouting association) the diﬀerence in callbacks from comparable non-religious
applicants of Christian origin was only modest and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Findings from these two correspondence tests clearly point to anti-Muslim discrimination
in the French labour market. However, their main limitation is the lack of variation in the
country of origin of applicants. Focusing on male candidates applying for real estate jobs in
France, Pierné (2013) varied both origin (i.e. native French vs. North African) and religion
(i.e. Catholic vs. Muslim vs. secular) independently and made comparisons within each
origin and religion group. His ﬁndings provide strong evidence of discrimination towards
immigrants of North African origin, regardless of religion, as well as discrimination
towards applicants signalling closeness to the Muslim religion, regardless of ethnic origin.
Yet, while this design has its beneﬁts in terms of identifying anti-Muslim discrimination,
Pierné could not compare multiple origin countries against each other. Furthermore, as
also noted by Valfort (2017), employers may have perceived native French applicants with
a Muslim aﬃliation as converts, which complicates the interpretation of the ﬁndings.
To summarise, these correspondence tests unanimously found signiﬁcantly lower call-
back rates for Muslim applicants. However, they were all conducted in France, a country
where public displays of religiosity are known to be tolerated poorly, likely as a result of
French legal secularism and the deeply-entrenched concept of laicité (Koopmans et al.
2005). Muslim migrants may experience less severe disadvantages in institutional contexts
that provide them with more favourable opportunity structures. In addition, the studies
focused on one single origin country (e.g. Senegal, Lebanon), culturally very distant
from Western Europe and with a much lower human development index than France.
To contribute to this debate, we focus on multiple countries of destination and multiple
countries of origin at the same time, a double-comparative research design that allows
us to examine the strength of anti-Muslim discrimination for diﬀerent Muslim groups
and across diﬀerent countries of reception.
Data and method: A double-comparative design for the study of anti-
Muslim discrimination
Between July 2016 and December 2017, we conducted ﬁve harmonised correspondence
tests in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK, as part of the GEMM
project (for more details on the design and ﬁeldwork: Lancee et al. 2019a, 2019b). Com-
pared to previous correspondence tests, the design of our study is methodologically inno-
vative for three reasons. First, we include a large number of minorities originating from
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geographical regions that vary in their level of cultural distance to the country of destina-
tion and are characterised by sizeable Muslim populations (North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe). Considering the variety of labour
market outcomes across Muslim groups found in the ethnic penalties literature (Johnston
et al. 2010; Khattab and Hussein 2018), the inclusion of multiple origin groups in the
design allows us to examine anti-Muslim discrimination for a more heterogeneous
sample of migrants, thus increasing the external validity of the ﬁndings. Second, the
design is factorial, that is, multiple characteristics, including ethnicity, religious closeness
and gender, were varied across applications. Third, the design is cross-nationally harmo-
nised and the ﬁeldwork was conducted at the same time in all ﬁve countries (see also
Lancee 2019, in this special issue).
The ﬁve countries of destination
The ﬁve countries of destination – Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK
– represent diﬀerent immigrant citizenship regimes and are characterised by distinctive
structures of church-state relations and legal frameworks for anti-discrimination policies
and the granting of cultural and religious rights to minorities (Koopmans et al. 2005).2
Within Europe, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands are the main countries of settle-
ment for Muslim migrants. In comparative perspective, the UK and the Netherlands
have been more open to accommodating Islam as a minority religion. The British state
has been relatively in favour of extending rights to new religions and a plurality of religions
are recognised in the public sphere. The Dutch model of religious pluralism is based on the
non-interference of the state in religious self-governance and Muslims in the Netherlands
have seized the opportunity to claim group rights to the same degree as other religious
denominations. By contrast, Germany only recognises Christian and Jewish denomina-
tions and grants them the favourable formal status of public corporations, a privilege
that is not extended to Islam. An ethnic model of nationhood further restricts immigrants’
access to citizenship rights. Spain and Norway fall somewhat in between these clearer cut
cases. Norway has a civic conception of nationhood, but is quite strict with granting reli-
gious rights to minorities. Conversely, Spain is less generous with granting citizenship
rights to immigrants but more lenient with regard to religious rights (Koopmans and
Michalowski 2017). At the start of the ﬁeldwork, the estimated Muslim population
shares in the ﬁve destination countries were approximately: 7.1% in the Netherlands,
6.3% in the UK, 6.1% in Germany, 5.7% in Norway and 2.6% in Spain (PEW 2017).
The design of a cross-nationally harmonised correspondence test
The implementation of a cross-nationally harmonised correspondence test is not an easy
task. One of the main challenges to harmonising the experimental design and protocols is
that job application procedures diﬀer across countries. For example, job applications in
Germany always contain a photo of the applicant and a copy of his/her school certiﬁcates,
while this is never the case in the UK or Norway. The guiding principle we followed in
designing the application material was maximum comparability in content, while at the
same time accounting for the speciﬁcities of each national labour market. We thus
designed applications that were in line with national standards and included in the CV
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and cover letter identical information applicants’ skills, schooling and work experience. As
a result, the applications present equally suitable candidates in each of the ﬁve countries. In
the introduction to this special issue, the comparability of the design is discussed in more
detail (more technical details can also be found in the codebook: Lancee et al. 2019b).
Another comparability issue was the choice of which occupations to target. We selected
six occupations: cook, payroll clerk, receptionist, sales representative, software developer,
and store assistant. Though occupational requirements are to some extent country-
speciﬁc, these six occupations are highly comparable insofar as in all ﬁve countries
entry requirements for store assistants, cooks, payroll clerks and receptionists are low to
intermediate (secondary education) whereas sales representatives and software developers
are graduate occupations requiring a higher education degree. We made sure that all appli-
cants had the formal qualiﬁcation that was required in each country in order to be con-
sidered for the job.3 Additional selection criteria were the following: First, to ensure
that we could send out enough applications by the end of the ﬁeldwork, we selected occu-
pations with a suﬃcient amount of vacancies per week in each country. Second, we care-
fully checked the cross-national comparability of entry requirements for each occupation.
Third, the six occupations also require diﬀerent levels of customer contact, which may
aﬀect the level of discrimination.
We applied to jobs that were advertised online on popular job portals. We used a
crawler to search the websites on a weekly basis and select openings that contained a
set of keywords. Unlike the classical paired design typically used in correspondence
tests with two or more applications being sent to the same employer, we relied on an
unpaired design and sent only one randomly selected application to each job opening
(see Valfort 2017 and Weichselbaumer 2015 for a similar approach). While a paired
design gives clear evidence of discrimination at the ﬁrm level, the risk of detection is
higher with this approach and employers may react in a minority-friendly way simply
for fear of being tested, leading to an underestimation of the level of discrimination, as
recently demonstrated by Weichselbaumer (2015). The other reason why we opted for
an unpaired design is that we are interested in testing for multiple treatments and compar-
ing a large number of minority groups: it would have been unfeasible to send all treatment
combinations to a single employer. A paired approach is not even necessary, unless the
interest is in within-employer eﬀects, which is not our case. With an unpaired design,
the random allocation of treatments and controls to experimental units still ensures
unbiased estimates, provided that the randomization process is done properly (Vuolo,
Uggen, and Lageson 2016).
Measurements
Callback. The dependent variable is the response received from the employer, i.e. the call-
back. We considered any interest in the applicant – whether expressed through an invita-
tion to attend a job interview, visit the organization for a trial day, complete a test, or
simply provide further information – as a positive callback (coded as 1). We assume
that employers make the eﬀort to contact candidates only if genuinely interested in
their application. After recording employers’ responses, we politely rejected any invitation
to job interviews or request to provide additional information within one working day.
Explicit rejections as well as applications that did not receive any response from the
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employer were coded as 0. We then performed the same analysis but with a stricter oper-
ationalization and treated as positive callbacks only those responses explicitly mentioning
an interest in the applicant, such as invitations to job interviews.
As anticipated above, the applications in our ﬁeld experiment were identical in all
respects, except for a number of characteristics, including the geographic origin of the
applicants, their religious closeness and gender.4
Migration status. We randomly assigned membership to a majority or minority group
to the applications. Minority applicants were either born in the receiving society or moved
there before the age of six.5 The opening paragraph of the cover letter mentioned that they
had received all relevant education and training in the receiving society. Hence, concerns
related to language ﬂuency or the transferability of human capital across borders should
not apply.
Geographic origin. We randomly assigned 15 origin countries with a sizeable Muslim
population to the proﬁles of minority applicants. Origin countries are signalled in the job
application by the applicant’s name, the mother tongue listed in the language section of the
résumé as well as by a sentence in the cover letter. As shown in Table 1, origin countries
can be grouped in four regions: Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan
Africa, Eastern Europe, South and Southeast Asia (Table A1 in the online appendix
reports the share of the population that self-identiﬁes as Muslim in each country).
Religious aﬃliation. We followed common practice in the discrimination literature
and signalled religious aﬃliation through volunteering activities. In the CV and cover
letter, all applicants described themselves as active members of a local community
centre where they engaged in professionally relevant activities (see example below). We
randomly assigned a volunteering association with a Muslim connotation and one with
a neutral connotation as a reference category. With this design, we can isolate the eﬀect
of disclosing one’s closeness to Islam from the eﬀect of originating from a country with
a substantial share of Muslims in the population.
To give an example, for the occupation of cooks, we signalled religious closeness as
follows (the complete application can be found in Appendix A2):
‘I am a passionate cook both in my professional life and in my spare time. This is shown by
my active participation in a Muslim/local community centre where I help with the prep-
aration of meals for various events like local fairs and open days.’ (Cover letter)
‘Volunteer at (Muslim) Youth Enrichment Project: Assisting with cooking and preparation
of meals for various events like open days and local fairs.’ (CV)
Compared to other studies, our religion treatment is rather mild. A possible criticism
of this design is that we did not explicitly signal religiosity or participation in religious
practices but merely omitted or disclosed the religious connotation of the organization
where the applicants did voluntary work. We believe this is a reasonable compromise
that strikes a balance between signalling closeness to Islam and making the application
as realistic as possible: applicants may be wary of mentioning religious practices in a job
application but are probably willing to stress additional human capital that has pro-
fessional relevance for the advertised jobs. As a result, any diﬀerence in callbacks due
to the disclosure of applicants’ religion is likely to be conservative (we come back to
this issue in the discussion).
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The distribution of applications across comparison groups and countries of origin is
shown in Table 1.6
Estimation strategy
To describe the extent of discrimination in each of the ﬁve countries, we start with a test of
proportions. We then continue with multivariate analysis and estimate linear probability
models predicting the chance that applicants receive a positive callback from employers.
We show results from pooled models with country ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as separate models
by country and by gender. All models include occupation ﬁxed eﬀects and control for
migration status (foreign-born or second generation). We used robust standard errors
for the estimation. Given the uneven distribution of applications across origin countries,
we also repeated the analyses and controlled for the region of origin. Results (available
upon request) are not aﬀected.
We proceed in three steps. First, we compare majority members to minority members
who volunteer in a secular association. On the one hand, involvement in a secular associ-
ation may signal integration in the host society. If this is the case, employers may perceive
these minority applicants as partial ingroup members with strong assimilation intentions
and treat them relatively favourably. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that
Table 1. Distribution of applications across comparison groups and countries of origin
Country of origin Type of voluntary work
Total N of sent
applications
PANEL A.
Majority groups
Secular majority (volunteering in
secular associations)
Germany 361 – 361
Netherlands 492 – 492
Norway 227 – 227
Spain 448 – 448
UK 404 – 404
PANEL B.
Minority groups
Muslim by default (volunteering in
secular associations)
Disclosed Muslim (volunteering in
Muslim associations)
Eastern Europe
Albania 184 66 250
Bulgaria 168 67 235
Russia 102 55 157
Middle East and North
Africa (MENA)
Egypt 124 59 183
Iran 116 112 228
Iraq 141 109 250
Lebanon 218 109 327
Morocco 476 467 943
Turkey 445 401 846
South and Southeast
Asia
Indonesia 105 58 163
India 139 46 185
Pakistan 430 389 819
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Ethiopia 90 62 155
Nigeria 309 157 466
Uganda 98 47 145
Total N applications 5,077 2,207 7,284
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employers still assume them to be Muslim for the mere fact of coming from a country
where commitment to Islam is strong. Hence, our use of the term Muslim by default
eﬀect to describe this type of disadvantage. Second, we narrow our focus to ethnic min-
orities only: half of these applications signalled closeness to Islam while the other half
did not. Since the only diﬀerence between the two groups is the addition of the word
‘Muslim’ to the name of the volunteering association, we interpret any diﬀerence in call-
backs as evidence of anti-Muslim discrimination and refer to this type of disadvantage as
Disclosed Muslim eﬀect. Third, we examine the variation in callback rates across origin
groups to test whether origin discrimination and anti-Muslim discrimination are indepen-
dent, additive sources of disadvantage that may expose members of ethnic minorities to a
double burden.
Results
We start the presentation of results by inspecting the share of positive callbacks received
by our three groups of interest – majority members, Muslims by default and disclosed
Muslims (columns 1–3 in Table 2). A ﬁrst observation is that callback rates, in general,
diﬀer a great deal across countries, possibly reﬂecting domestic labour market circum-
stances or diﬀerences in the quality of the application material. Our main interest is in
diﬀerences across countries in the Muslim by default eﬀect (column 4) and disclosed
Muslim eﬀect (column 5). As expected, majority members receive the highest callback
rates, a pattern that we ﬁnd in all countries except for Spain. Compared to majority
members, applicants from ethnic minorities who volunteer in secular associations are
treated less favourably, and this is particularly the case in Norway, the UK and, to a
lesser extent, the Netherlands. The Muslim by default eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant
(one-tailed test of proportions) in all countries except for Spain. This eﬀect may corre-
spond to a mere country-of-origin eﬀect (ethnic discrimination) or partly capture a reli-
giosity eﬀect, to the extent that employers simply assume that applicants coming from a
country with a substantial Muslim population are Muslim by default, regardless of
actual religious practice.
The ﬁfth column of Table 2 shows the ratio between columns two and three. As origin
countries are held constant in this comparison, we can rule out a mere country-of-origin
Table 2. Callbacks by country.
Callback rates Callback ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Country of
destination
Majority
members
Muslims by
default
Disclosed
Muslims
Majority/Muslims
by default
Muslims by default/
Disclosed Muslims
Germany 50.57 44.34 40.59 1.14* 1.09
Netherlands 53.43 40.79 35.33 1.31*** 1.15
Norway 32.16 16.61 10.92 1.94*** 1.52*
Spain 17.19 19.19 16.28 0.90 1.18
UK 24.15 13.89 12.38 1.74*** 1.12
Germany 37.50 30.37 29.46 1.23* 1.03
Netherlands 43.87 31.70 26.01 1.38*** 1.22*
Norway 22.47 13.36 7.86 1.68** 1.70*
Spain 16.29 18.87 15.83 0.86 1.19
UK 12.86 9.08 6.75 1.42* 1.34∼
Note: Test of proportions, one-tailed. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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eﬀect and interpret any diﬀerence in callbacks as religious discrimination. Results point to
religious discrimination only in Norway. When looking at the stricter callback indicator,
religious discrimination also occurs in the Netherlands and the UK (though the diﬀerence
is only marginally signiﬁcant in the UK). In Spain and Germany, the diﬀerence in call-
backs is minimal and statistically indistinguishable from zero. We come back to this
issue in the discussion.
While Table 2 is informative, it does not account for the diﬀerent distribution of appli-
cations across occupations, which may drive cross-national diﬀerences in callbacks if, for
example, occupations that were overrepresented in a given country are also the ones where
employers are more biased. In Table 3, we present a series of multivariate linear probability
models that include occupation ﬁxed eﬀects and also control for the migration status of the
applicants. To ease interpretation, applicants from Muslim countries who volunteer in
secular associations (‘Muslims by default’) are the reference category. In the pooled
models with country ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient for the majority group is positive and stat-
istically signiﬁcant, and has substantially the same size for both genders (models 2 and 3).
When looking at each country separately, in the UK, Norway and the Netherlands,
Muslims by default are more than 10 percentage points less likely than majority
members to receive a callback. In other words, in spite of visible signals of civic engage-
ment as well as valuable, job-relevant human capital (we reiterate that volunteer work
was always related to the advertised job), members of ethnic minorities face severe dis-
crimination in three of the ﬁve countries. Diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels in Germany, while in Spain the point estimate has the opposite sign than
expected. In a pooled model, the interaction eﬀect between the comparison groups of
interest and the country dummies indicates that the Muslim by default disadvantage is sig-
niﬁcantly smaller in Spain than in the other countries, with Germany occupying an inter-
mediary position and Norway and the Netherlands being the least accommodating
Table 3. Probability to receive a positive callback from the employer (Linear probability model).
(1)
Pooled
model
(2)
Pooled Men
only
(3)
Pooled
Women only
(4)
UK
(5)
Spain
(6)
Germany
(7)
Norway
(8)
Netherlands
Ref. Muslim by default
Secular Majority 0.066*** 0.052** 0.083*** 0.108*** −0.032 0.056∼ 0.131** 0.098***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.041) (0.029)
Disclosed Muslim −0.037** −0.031* −0.036* −0.014 −0.032 −0.047 −0.060* −0.034
(0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025)
Country ﬁxed
eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes
Occupation ﬁxed
eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.294*** 0.300*** 0.287*** 0.217*** 0.241*** 0.623*** 0.193*** 0.631***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.033) (0.024) (0.038) (0.045) (0.029)
N applications 7152 3756 3396 1641 1504 1410 733 1864
R2 0.163 0.175 0.156 0.042 0.059 0.165 0.103 0.184
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed. ∼p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
All models control for migration status (foreign-born/second generation).
Dependent variable: any interest from the employer.
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contexts (not shown but available upon request).7 In additional analyses, we re-ran the
models after excluding origin countries that may not be as readily associated with
Islam, for which the ‘Muslim by default’ argument may not apply (we did this by only con-
sidering countries of origin where at least 75% of the population is Muslim, according to
Table A1 in the appendix): results did not change.
We now shift our focus to applicants who volunteered at a Muslim community centre.
The pooled models indicate that simply adding the word ‘Muslim’ in the application
further decreases the likelihood that ethnic minorities receive a callback by about four per-
centage points, a diﬀerence that is statistically signiﬁcant and, again, substantially the same
for both men and women (results are nearly the same when using the stricter callback indi-
cator in Table 4). In the by-country regressions, the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant only for
Norway, where the point estimate also shows a larger Muslim stigma (−0.06 at p < .05).
The results for Germany and the Netherlands are substantially in line with the pooled
models, suggesting that power issues may have prevented us from ﬁnding statistically sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects. The coeﬃcient for the disclosed Muslim eﬀect in the Netherlands is mar-
ginally signiﬁcant at p < .1 when considering only explicitly positive responses in Table 4.
In Spain and the UK, we ﬁnd no evidence of religious discrimination.
Finally, we zoom in more closely on the minority groups (Table 5). As the models show,
the religious discrimination eﬀect is comparable in size for men and women, and it is
robust to the inclusion of controls for the geographical area (and also for origin countries
– models not shown). It is interesting to observe that applicants from MENA or African
countries experience a double burden: independent of the stigma they face for signalling
their closeness to a Muslim association, they are also penalised for the geographic region
they originate from (callbacks of ethnic minorities are shown in Table A.3 in the online
appendix, separately by region of origin). On the basis of our data, we can only speculate
on the mechanism underlying this eﬀect (an eﬀect that is consistent with the analysis pre-
sented by Veit and Thijssen in this special issue 2019). This further disadvantage is
Table 4. Probability to receive an invitation from the employer (Linear probability model).
(1)
Pooled
model
(2)
Pooled Men
only
(3)
Pooled Women
only
(4)
UK
(5)
Spain
(6)
Germany
(7)
Norway
(8)
Netherlands
Ref. Muslim by default
Secular Majority 0.048*** 0.046** 0.051** 0.040∼ −0.036 0.063∼ 0.075* 0.102***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033) (0.037) (0.028)
Disclosed Muslim −0.035*** −0.026∼ −0.041** −0.023 −0.033 −0.017 −0.060* −0.043∼
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023)
Country ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Occupation ﬁxed
eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.227*** 0.245*** 0.205*** 0.147*** 0.238*** 0.479*** 0.171*** 0.538***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.039) (0.043) (0.029)
N applications 7152 3756 3396 1641 1504 1410 733 1864
R2 0.119 0.130 0.113 0.018 0.046 0.109 0.095 0.160
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed. ∼p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
All models control for migration status (foreign-born/second generation).
Dependent variable: explicit interest from the employer (e.g. invitation to a job interview or notiﬁcation of being
shortlisted).
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especially strong for African men and may point to skin colour discrimination (i.e. African
migrants being more visible minorities may suﬀer from the double penalty of being
Muslim and black). Another interpretation is that employers have particular ‘Muslim’
associations with some origin regions, and not others (for example, Asian countries com-
pared to MENA countries). This would be consistent with previous studies showing that
Muslims from former Yugoslavia reported lower levels of religiosity than other Muslim
groups, while Pakistanis reported much higher levels (e.g. Torrekens and Jacobs 2015).
However, the interaction term between the Muslim treatment and the geographic
region dummies was not statistically signiﬁcant.
Based on the presented data we cannot rule out the possibility that employers, instead
of discriminating against Muslims, are simply expressing a reluctance to hire applicants
that openly disclose their religion – any religion – when applying for a job. We were able
to test this argument in a robustness check. We narrowed our focus to minorities orig-
inating from countries with both a substantial Christian and a substantial Muslim popu-
lation (Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia, and
Uganda). We considered applicants who mentioned in the application their voluntary
work at a Christian community centre (these additional observations were dropped in
the main analyses presented so far) and compared them to applicants who volunteered
at a Muslim community centre. We found that signalling closeness to Islam in the appli-
cation signiﬁcantly reduces callback rates, whereas signalling closeness to Christianity
does not (Table A.4 in the online appendix). This result holds even when adding
origin country ﬁxed eﬀects, which we interpret as compelling evidence of anti-Muslim
discrimination.
Table 5. Probability to receive a positive callback from the employer. Analysis conducted on a sub-
sample of applicants that only included ethnic minorities (Linear probability model).
(1)
Pooled
(3)
Pooled –
Men only
(4)
Pooled –
Women only
(5)
Pooled
(6)
Pooled –
Men only
(7)
Pooled –
Women only
DV: Any interest DV: Invitation/Shortlist
Ref. Muslim by default
Disclosed Muslim −0.034** −0.030* −0.030∼ −0.033** −0.024∼ −0.039*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016)
Muslim group (ref. Eastern Europe):
MENA −0.058** −0.061* −0.055∼ −0.043* −0.058* −0.024
(0.019) (0.025) (0.028) (0.018) (0.025) (0.026)
Sub-Saharan Africa −0.069** −0.098*** −0.036 −0.044* −0.079** −0.005
(0.022) (0.030) (0.033) (0.021) (0.028) (0.031)
South and Southeast Asia −0.040∼ −0.050∼ −0.026 −0.027 −0.048∼ 0.001
(0.021) (0.028) (0.032) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029)
Country ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.302*** 0.318*** 0.281*** 0.243*** 0.289*** 0.185***
(0.025) (0.034) (0.037) (0.023) (0.032) (0.034)
N applications 5263 2801 2462 5263 2801 2462
R2 0.155 0.168 0.147 0.107 0.116 0.104
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed. ∼p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
All models control for migration status (foreign-born/second generation).
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Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we relied on a cross-nationally harmonised correspondence test conducted in
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK to examine discrimination against
Muslim job applicants at point of hire. With our design, we were able to distinguish
between the eﬀect of originating from a country with a sizeable Muslim population (a
mere ‘country of origin’ or ‘Muslim by default’ eﬀect) and the additional stigma that appli-
cants face when signalling their closeness to Islam in their job application (a ‘disclosed
Muslim’ eﬀect). We contributed to an extensive literature in both sociology and economics
that has made use of the correspondence testing methodology to identify ethnic discrimi-
nation in the labour market. So far, however, the lack of comparative studies has prevented
researchers from directly comparing rates of anti-Muslim discrimination across national
contexts. The double-comparative design of our ﬁeld experiment allowed us to compare
callbacks across destination countries as well as national origin groups.
Findings revealed substantial gaps in callbacks between majority members and
members of minority groups in three of the ﬁve countries, a sobering reminder that the
integration of ethnic minorities in European labour markets is still an unﬁnished
project. Considering that human capital was held constant and that minorities’ civic
engagement in a volunteer association had clear professional relevance, it is disheartening
to ﬁnd diﬀerences in callbacks of such magnitude in Norway, the Netherlands and the UK.
Interestingly, the level of discrimination we found in Norway is much higher than that
documented in prior studies (e.g. Midtbøen 2016). Our choice to exclusively focus on
the private sector might explain this diﬀerence, given that previous Norwegian studies
also included the public sector, where discrimination was shown to be much lower.
Another surprising result is that ‘Muslims by default’ in Spain are treated no diﬀerently
than the majority population. Given the high level of unemployment recorded in Spain at
the time of our ﬁeldwork and the argument that employers are more likely to discriminate
if faced with an excess of supply (e.g. Baert et al. 2015), this ﬁnding is puzzling. More gen-
erally, the cross-national variation in the size of the callback gap between groups deﬁes any
institutional explanation based on diﬀerences in citizenship regimes. Muslims by default
are heavily discriminated in the Netherlands and the UK, countries that are relatively open
with regard to the accommodation of Islam as a minority religion. The climate of open
hostility towards Muslims fostered by far-right parties in both countries may provide a
more ﬁtting explanation for the high levels of discrimination we documented. Conversely,
the Muslim by default eﬀect was not much pronounced in Germany, a country with a long
tradition of rather restrictive citizenship laws and naturalization policies. In Germany, the
more extensive documentation required from job candidates provides employers with
more information than in other national contexts, possibly mitigating their biases at
point of hire (see Thijssen et al. in this special issue 2019).
Besides a ‘country-of-origin’ eﬀect, we also found evidence of an additional disadvan-
tage for minority applicants volunteering in an organization with a Muslim connotation,
which we interpret as a ‘religious closeness’ eﬀect. In our study, the signal of religious clo-
seness was indirect and should be interpreted with caution. Still, the percentage point
diﬀerence in callback rates registered in Norway and the Netherlands is similar in magni-
tude to that found in France in the study by Pierné (2013). Although with ﬁve countries it
is not possible to formally test for institutional eﬀects, it is interesting to note that the
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religious closeness eﬀect is strongest in Norway, a country that is very restrictive with
regard to the accommodation of religious minority rights, and less pronounced in
Spain and the UK, which are both more generous with granting religious rights to
Muslims.
In light of these ﬁndings, applicants of Muslim faith could strategically conceal their
closeness to Islam in the job application to avoid being discriminated on religious
grounds. This technique of ‘resume whitening’, however, may result in psychological
costs and identity struggles (Kang et al. 2016). Future qualitative research could help to
uncover whether explicitly signalling closeness to Islam in job applications is perceived
by employers as evidence of religious extremism or strong in-group bonding and lack
of integration. It is also important to note that our ﬁndings do not necessarily rule out
the ‘religion as a bridge’ argument (Foner and Alba 2008). It is still possible that the invol-
vement of migrants in religious communities gives them access to resources and contacts
that are useful for their job search. In other words, the resources and contacts provided by
religious organizations may still aﬀect migrants’ decision to apply for a job in the ﬁrst
place, a type of self-selection that we did not examine in this study.
Self-selection and supply-side search behaviour more generally may also explain the
discrepancy between our ﬁndings and Koopmans’s (2016) conclusion that the employ-
ment disadvantage of Muslims is mostly due to sociocultural variables. Studies based on
survey data can show, as Koopmans did, that the lower human capital of Muslim min-
orities and their more limited access to bridging social capital can largely explain why
Muslims are underrepresented in the labour market. Correspondence tests like ours
show that, ceteris paribus, Muslim applicants with similar levels of human and social
capital to the majority group are less likely to be hired, a clear evidence of double stan-
dards. The crucial issue to keep in mind is that, as also mentioned by Koopmans (2016,
214), the ceteris paribus condition more often than not does not apply in the real world
(see also Pager 2007 for a discussion of how to reconcile evidence from survey data and
ﬁeld experiments). It is plausible that members of ethnic or religious minorities anticipate
discrimination and adapt their job search strategies accordingly, searching more intensely
and across a broader set of occupations, often at the cost of coherent career trajectories
(Pager and Pedulla 2015). This self-selection behaviour cannot be captured in ﬁeld exper-
iments and may lead to a disadvantage that remains invisible in Koopman’s study too,
which does not control for search intensity, occupational type or sector. The next chal-
lenge for scholars, interested in the integration of minorities in the labour market, is to
devise novel research designs that can identify the share of the variance in employment
that is explained by discrimination relative to other factors.
To conclude, our study is an important contribution to the scientiﬁc literature on reli-
gious and ethnic discrimination. We showed that employers discriminate against appli-
cants originating from countries with a substantial Muslim population, even against
those who show signs of civic engagement through their voluntary work. We also
demonstrated that country-of-origin eﬀects in combination with anti-Muslim discrimi-
nation produce severe double penalties for minority applicants, especially for male
applicants from Africa and the Middle East. To the extent that migrants decide to
apply, they are penalised for the mere fact of signalling their closeness to Islam in the
job application, a religious penalty that is more severe in some countries (Norway)
than others (Spain).
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Notes
1. In the UK, the large majority of the sampled job openings were based in England.
2. It is worth stressing that we do not intend to give any causal interpretation to speciﬁc insti-
tutional eﬀects, as we are well-aware that other factors are co-varying with the institutional
diﬀerences in church-state relations and citizenship regimes that informed our country selec-
tion (e.g. state of the labour market; application requirements).
3. For example, in the German sample all applicants to low- or mid-skilled occupations had
completed a dual apprenticeship.
4. We also varied the amount of information on applicants’ past performance and social skills
that was included in the application as well as applicants’ grades in school. These treatments
are not discussed any further as they are not directly relevant for our analysis. Note that they
were all orthogonal to the treatments of direct interest for us (ethnic origin and religious clo-
seness), meaning that leaving them out of the analysis leaves our results unbiased. A more
detailed description of the experimental design can be found in Lancee et al. (2019a, 2019b).
5. See Veit and Thijssen in this special issue (2019).
6. Applications are not evenly distributed across origin countries. This is because in each des-
tination country we oversampled those groups that, for historical or other reasons, are par-
ticularly relevant (e.g. Turks in Germany and the Netherlands, or Pakistani in Norway and
the UK). This enabled us to directly compare their outcomes across countries (e.g. see Larsen
and Di Stasio 2019).
7. In Spain, we used Castillian names to signal the majority group. However, more detailed
analyses for the Spanish sample show that applicants with Castilian names receive signiﬁ-
cantly lower call-back rates in Catalonia compared to other Spanish regions. To address
the possible concern that the use of Castillan names in Catalonia may drive discrimi-
nation estimates downward (Catalan vacancies account for roughly 30 percent of the
Spanish sample), we re-ran all models after excluding observations from Catalonia.
Results remain stable.
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Appendices
Appendix A1. Muslim population in the countries of origin
Countries Share of population that is Muslim (%)
Eastern Europe
Albania 79.9
Bulgaria 12.2
Russia 11.7
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Egypt 94.6
Iran 99.4
Iraq 99∼
Lebanon 59.3
Morocco 99∼
Turkey 98∼
South and Southeast Asia
Indonesia 88.2
India 13.4
Pakistan 96.3
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Ethiopia 33.9
Nigeria 50.4
Uganda 12.1
Source: http://www.pewforum.org/chart/interactive-data-table-world-muslim-population-by-country/.
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Appendix A2. An example of a CV and cover letter used in the study to apply for a
job as cook
Dear Sir or Madam,
I would like to apply for the position of [ job title] which I have seen advertised on [online job platform]. I
haveworked for four years as a cook inkitchens anddining facilities. I likemycurrent jobbut I amseeking
new challenges in a role that would allow me to reach my full potential. I would be happy to relocate.
As a chef de partie at [name of current employer] I prepare, cook and serve meals to the highest
standards required. Over the years I have improved my cooking skills with a la carte menu and
also gained experience in buﬀets and catering. I understand the importance of health and safety
regulations and basic food hygiene procedures. I always make sure that food is stored and
chilled properly and that the kitchen and the equipment are kept clean.
[Additional information on past performance: My experience in a busy restaurant has prepared me
well to work under pressure. While taking on a wide variety of tasks and duties I have been able to
show my ability to rise to challenges. I am a fast learner and I am always eager to develop new skills.
My present employer has been very satisﬁed with my work and has passed more responsibilities on to
me. For example, since last year I have been training the new kitchen assistants. I am conﬁdent that I
can bring the same level of high performance to your team.]
I am very ﬂexible and I am happy to work outside of regular working hours or at weekends. I can
work well on my own but I also enjoy being in a team.
[Additional information on social skills: My colleagues and friends think I am a pleasant, trustworthy
and warm person who gets along with people from all walks of life. I am a team player who values a posi-
tive work environment and that is why I am always friendly and attentive to other people’s needs.]
I am a passionate cook both in my professional life and in my spare time. This is shown by my
participation in a [Muslim/local] community centre, where I help prepare meals for various
events like local fairs and open days.
Thank you for taking the time to consider my application. I am keen to discuss my experience and
skills with you in more detail. Note that although I have a Pakistani background all my education
and training has been in Britain [only for foreign born: since the age of 6] and I have the right to
work in the UK.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Yours faithfully,
[Minority/Majority treatment: Name and last name]
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Tariq Anwar
Address, London
Mobile: [mobile number] | Email: [email address]
Personal statement
A qualiﬁed cook with over four years of experience, now looking for opportunities to further
develop in the hospitality sector. A self-starter, able to work on own initiative and as part of a team.
[A hard-working person, consistently meeting the targets of the kitchen and responsible for training
the new kitchen assistants.]
[A friendly and outgoing person who gets on well with a wide range of people. A team player who
values a good work environment.]
Work Experience
July 2014 – present
Chef de Partie, Hotel Ibis, London
• Assisting the head chef in the day-to-day running of the kitchen
• Preparing and cooking meals
• Following recipes to meet restaurant’s standards
• Strictly complying with food quality and temperature regulations
• Overseeing kitchen administration and stock management
[• Always providing a high quality service from fresh ingredients and on time]
[• Responsible for training new kitchen assistants]
September 2012 – June 2014
Commis Chef, Ealing Hospital, London
• Washed, peeled and trimmed food for cold buﬀets and side dishes
• Ensured that all food served was arranged properly and met quality standards
• Checked and ordered stock from suppliers, unloaded deliveries and organised the storeroom
• Checked the temperature of the fridge and followed safety and hygiene protocols
Education
2010–2012
College of North West London
Level 2 Diploma in Professional Cookery (City & Guilds) 2005–2010
Greenford High School, Southall, London
[Grade treatment: 4 GCSEs, including Math]
Skills
Computer skills: Microsoft Oﬃce, Outlook
Training: Essential Food Hygiene certiﬁcate, COSHH training
Language skills: Bilingual English and Urdu | French (basic)
Driving: Full, clean UK driving licence; in possession of own car
Volunteer work
January 2014–present
Volunteer at [Muslim] Youth Enrichment Project
Assisting with cooking and preparation of meals for various events like open days and local fairs.
References
Available on request.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 21
Appendix A3. Callbacks by geographic origin of minority groups
Appendix A4. Probability to receive a positive callback from the employer.
(Linear probability model)
(1)
Pooled model –
Any interest
(2)
Pooled model –
Only invitation/shortlist
Ref. Muslim by default
Secular Majority 0.056** 0.090* 0.035* 0.047
(0.017) (0.035) (0.016) (0.030)
Disclosed Muslim −0.053** −0.049* −0.040* −0.037*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
Disclosed Christian 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Country ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin country ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Constant 0.277*** 0.269*** 0.203*** 0.191***
(0.022) (0.031) (0.021) (0.029)
N applications 4656 4656 4656 4656
R2 0.166 0.174 0.124 0.130
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed. ∼ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
All models control for migration status (foreign-born/second generation). Analysis conducted on a sub-sample that only
included the majority group and minorities from countries with both a substantial Muslim and a substantial Christian
population (Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia, and Uganda).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Eastern Europe Middle East and North Africa Sub Saharan Africans South and Southeast Asia
PANEL A: Any interest from the employer
Germany 57.14 41.61 44.72 37.84
Netherlands 45.13 37.81 29.13 39.69
Norway 21.82 13.45 11.48 13.28
Spain 20.57 17.24 13.46 22.46
UK 11.86 13.57 12.47 13.97
PANEL B: Shortlisting or invitation to a job interview
Germany 39.56 29.33 32.52 26.13
Netherlands 33.19 28.39 24.27 33.59
Norway 18.18 12.61 11.48 8.49
Spain 20.57 16.64 13.46 22.46
UK 6.78 8.57 7.48 8.58
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